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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant, Dalrie Cook (hereinafter, "Dalrie") and Hugo Arias (hereinafter, "Hugo")
were married on April 9, 1993, and they are the parents of two children, namely
was born

and

who was born

who
R. p. 61. A

trial was held on all pending divorce matters on January 6, 12, and 13, 2011. R. p. 63. The only
relevant issues for this appeal relate to the custody and visitation issues presented during said
trial. At trial, Dalrie sought an award of primary physical custody of the minor children and to
be allowed to relocate to Salt Lake City, Utah. R. p. 83. Hugo agreed that Dalrie would have
custody of the children if she remained in Idaho Falls, however; if she relocated, then he wanted
to be awarded primary physical custody of the minor children. R. p. 88. Magistrate Judge Earl
Blower presided over the trial. R. p. 107. Dalrie and Hugo were divorced, effective January 13,
2011, per the Decree of Divorce, Nunc Pro Tune, entered January 25, 2011. R. p. 59.
Judge Blower issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 4, 2011.
R. p. 61. In said Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, Judge Blower found that Hugo
should be awarded primary physical custody of the children unless Dalrie filed a statement with
the Court indicating her desire to remain in Idaho Falls. R. p. 99. If she did so, then she would
retain primary physical custody of the children. R. p. 99. On February 11, 2011, Dalrie filed her

Statement of Unequivocal Desire, whereby indicating that she would not be relocating to Salt
Lake City. Judge Blower then entered his Supplemental Order which finally resolved all issues
related to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and all pending post trial motions. R. p.
123. In said Supplemental Order, Judge Blower ordered that "the children shall reside with
Dalrie'', and thereafter, provided a visitation schedule for Hugo. R. p. 125.
The present appeal evolves from the filing of Dalrie's Verified Petition to J4odi(v Prior
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Court Orders, which was filed on March 25, 2013. R. p. 178. In said Petition, Dalrie sought an
order allowing the children to relocate to Salt Lake City, Utah with her. R. p. 179. This Petition
was based on the material and substantial changes of circumstances which she outlined in said
Petition. R. p. 179-80. Hugo filed his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Prior

Court Orders and Request for J.C. §32-718 Violation on September 5, 2013. R. p. 205. Dalrie
filed her Response to Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Prior Court Orders and

Request/or Idaho Code Section 32-718 Violation on June 17, 2013. R. p. 208. Dalrie also filed
her Motion for Temporary Orders and Affidavit of

in Support of Plaintiff's

Motion for Temporary Orders and Affidavit of Plaintiff in Support of Motion for Temporary
Orders on August 5, 2013. R. p. 215-233. Dalrie was seeking a temporary order to be allowed
to move the children to Salt Lake City, while her Petition to Modify was pending. 1 R. p. 215.
Hugo filed various Affidavits in response to Dalrie's Motion for Temporary Order. R. p. 247263. A hearing was held on both parties' motions on August 20, 2013. R. p. 264. After hearing,
Judge Gardner entered his Order Granting Motion to Dismiss. R. p. 264. In said Order, Judge
Gardner dismissed Dalrie's Verified Petition to Modify Prior Court Orders, he denied Dalrie's

Motion for Temporary Orders, and he awarded Hugo his attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-120.
R. p. 275-276. And specifically, he entered the following order: ''IT IS FURTHER ORDERED
1

that the prior orders herein remain in full force and effect.""' R. p. 276. This Order became final
when Judge Gardner entered his Judgment on September 19, 2013. R. p. 308. Dalrie appealed
this Judgment on October 29, 2013, to the District Court. R. p. 34 7.

1

In the Affidavit (J/Plaint([f in Support <~( Motion for Temporary Orders, Dalrie outlines many of the
reasons why she should be allowed to move with the children to Salt Lake City, Utah. R. p. 223. She also informed
the Court in this pleading, that she was in fact relocating to Salt Lake City, Utah. R. p. 224.
1

~

This order was also made part of the .Judgment. R. p. 309.
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Prior to Dalrie's Appeal being filed, Hugo filed his Motion for Expedited Hearing as to
Custody, which was filed September 5, 2013. R. p. 278. In said Motion, Hugo sought an award

of custody of the minor children, despite the fact that he had not filed a Petition to Modify the
Court's Supplemental Order. R. p. 278. Hugo's Motion was supported by Hugo's Affidavits.
R. p. 282 and 292. Dalrie filed her Objection to Motion for Expedited Hearing as to Custody
along with Affidavits in support thereof. R. p. 297-307. A hearing was held on Hugo's Motion
on September 19, 2013.

R. p. 316.

After said hearing, Judge Gardner entered his Order

Granting Motion for Expedited Hearing as to Custody on October 3, 2013, and in so doing,

awarded, in relevant part, Hugo primary physical custody of the children, Hugo his attorney fees
pursuant to LC. 12-120, and ordered Dalrie to pay child support to Hugo. The change of custody
was based solely upon IRCP Rule 60(b)(6). When this Order was entered, there was no pending
Petition to Modify.

Judge Gardner did not award Dalrie any long term visitation with the

children. R. p. 324-326. This decision became final when Judge Gardner entered his Rule 54(b)
Certificate on November 25, 2013. R. p. 330.

As to the two attorney fee awards, Hugo filed a Memorandum and Affidavit of Attorney
Fees on October 1, 2013 and Memorandum and A..ffidavit of Attorney Fees from October 3, 2013
Order on October 15, 2013. R. p. 33 8. Dalrie timely filed objections to both filings by Hugo, as

evidenced in her Objection to Memorandum and Affidavit of Attorney Fees, filed October 8,
2013 (R. p. 334); her Amended Objection to Memorandum and Affidavit of Attorney Fees, filed
October 10, 2013 (R. p. 3 36); and her Objection to Memorandum and A..ffidavit o.(Attorney Fees
from October 3, 2013, filed October 23, 20 I 3 (R. p. 345). A hearing was held on the issue of the

attorney fee award on February 12, 2014. Tr. (February 12, 2014 hearing). After said hearing,
Judge Gardner entered his Order Granting Attorney Fees. Costs and Judgment on February 13,
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2014. R. p. 356. In doing so, he awarded Hugo a portion of his requested attorney fees. R. p.
356.
Dalrie sought a permissive appeal to this Court, and the same was granted when this
Court entered its Order Granting Motion for Permission to Appeal to the Supreme Court on
February 10, 2014. R. p. 354. This Court ordered that all issues raised in both of Dalrie's
appeals, would be heard by the Supreme Court. R. p. 354-355.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Magistrate err by granting a change of custody to Hugo when there was

no petition to modify pending and without having an evidentiary hearing?
2.

Even if the Magistrate did not err by changing custody without a pending petition

to modify, did the Magistrate err by not defining Dalrie's visitation with the children?
3.

Did the Magistrate err by awarding Hugo attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-120?

4.

Is Dalrie entitled to attorney fees and costs on this appeal?
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

Custody issues.

The standard of review in custody determinations was well stated by this Court in
Peterson v. Peterson, 153 Idaho 318, 320-21 (2012), when it outlined the following:
Child custody determinations made by a magistrate court are
reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard.
Schneider v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 415,420, 258 P.3d 350, 355
(2011) (citing Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 454, 80
P.3d 1049, 1055 (2003)). In its analysis, this Court asks first
whether the magistrate court correctly perceived the custody issue
as one of discretion; then whether the magistrate court acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to the
court; and finally, whether the magistrate court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Schultz v..\'chultz. 145 Idaho 859 86162. 187 P.J<l 1234. 1236--37 ('.~008) .
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"An abuse of discretion occurs when the evidence is insufficient to
support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and welfare of
the children would be best served by a particular custody award or
modification." Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713. 170 P.3d
375,378 (2007). When reviewing the magistrate court's findings of
fact, this Court "will not set aside the findings on appeal unless
they are clearly erroneous such that they are not based upon
substantial and competent evidence." Id. Even if the evidence is
conflicting, findings of fact based on substantial evidence will not
be overturned on appeal. Id. (citing State v. Hart, 142 Idaho 721,
723, 132 P.3d 1249, 1251 (2006)).
2.

Rule 60(b)(6) issues.

As set forth in Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,576 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court has
held that "this Court reviews a trial court's dismissal of a Rule 60(b )( 6) motion for relief for
abuse of discretion." "Accordingly, the Court must examine: '(l) whether the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of
reason." Id. (citing Win o(Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 753, 53 P.3d
330, 336 (2002)).
3.

Attorney fee issues.

An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject
to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 901 (2004). The
party disputing the award of attorney fees has the burden of showing an abuse of discretion. Id.
IV. ARGUMENT

1.

The Magistrate erred by granting a change of custody to Hugo when there
was no pending petition to modify and no evidcntiary hearing.

After the original trial of this matter, Magistrate Judge Earl Blower entered his
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Supplemental Order on April 29, 2011. This Order awarded primary custody of the children to

Dalrie and visitation to Hugo. On March 25, 2013, Dalrie filed her Verified Petition to Mod(fy
Prior Court Orders wherein, she sought, in relevant part, an order from the Court allowing her to

relocate with the children to Salt Lake City, Utah. Pursuant to Hugo's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Prior Court Orders and Request for J.C. §32-718 Violation,

Magistrate Judge Gardner issued his Order Granting Motion to Dismiss on August 30, 2013. In
entering said Order, Judge Gardner dismissed Dalrie's Verified Petition and he entered the
following Order:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the prior orders herein remain in
full force and effect.
Based upon the entry of this Order, it was clear that the original custody order contained within
the Supplemental Order would remain in effect, which provided that Dalrie was awarded
custody. 3 However, Hugo then filed a Motion for Expedited Hearing as to Custody. In said
Motion, Hugo sought a change of custody, despite the fact that he chose not to file a Petition to

Modify. The Magistrate, when he issued his Order Granting Motion for Expedited Hearing as
to Custody, after hearing, not only changed custody to Hugo, even though there was not a

Petition to Modify pending, but he also modified Judge Blower's April 29, 2011 Supplemental
Order. This was done under the guise ofIRCP Rule 60(b)(6). It is clear that the Magistrate

realized that he had to enter a new Order, and he did not have a Petition to Modify pending.
Thus, he took it upon himself, without an evidentiary hearing, to change an Order which had
been entered two and one-half years earlier! In doing so, the Magistrate abused his discretion.
a.

Dalrie was not placed on notice that she could lose custody under

3 The reason for this is due to the fact that up to the time the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss was

entered, there had been no order entered which modified said Supplemental Order.
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IRCP Rule 60(b)(6).
Hugo did not request relief under 60(b)(6) in his Motion for Expedited Hearing as to
Custody. IRCP Rule 7(b)(l) requires that motions "state with particularity the grounds therefor
including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any, under which it is filed." Hugo did not
do this, but rather, the Magistrate determined that this was the appropriate rule under which to
change custody. This is a major issue, as this decision vastly affects the lives of the children and
their parents. To make such a drastic change, without notice of the applicable rule to Dalrie, is
wrong. This was an abuse of discretion as it did not place Dalrie on notice of the applicable rule,
so that she could adequately defend the same.

b.

Child custody cannot be altered under IRCP Rule 60(b)(6).

There can be no modification of a prior custody order without the filing of a Petition to
Modify. IRCP Rule 60(b)(6) is not a substitute mechanism to allow for a change of custody.
IRCP Rule 3(a) provides that every civil action is "commenced by the filing of a complaint with
the court." Of course the Complaint may be denominated as a Petition. Id. Furthermore, Local
Rule C.3., in the Seventh Judicial District provides as follows:
To modify an existing order of child support or of child custody
(including visitation) the party seeking modification shall file a
petition specifically setting forth the change in circumstances
relied upon and the modification sought. Service of the petition
shall be made pursuant to Rule 5(b) I.R.C.P. unless the opposing
party is not represented or there is no attorney of record for the
opposing party.
And finally, it is well stated in Idaho that in order to modify child custody, there must be a
showing of a material, permanent and substantial change in conditions and circumstances
subsequent to entry of the original decree which would indicate to the court's satisfaction that
modification would be for the best interests of the child. Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 224-25
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(2011 ).
Thus, it is clear that in order to change child custody, a Petition to Modify must be filed
and an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine whether there has been a material and
substantial change of circumstances to modify a prior custody order. As this Court stated in
Allbright v. Allbright, 147 Idaho 752, 755 (2009), a court presiding over a child custody matter
does not become a family czar with unlimited authority to order the parents to do anything that
the court believes is in the best interest of the children. Rather, there are clearly established rules
and mechanisms to provide for a change of custody, and to protect each parties' due process
rights. In this case, the Magistrate wanted a result without following the proper procedure to
change custody. He cannot do this as he does not have unlimited authority to order whatever he
so desires, even ifhe believes it is in the best interests of the children. By changing a child
custody determination under IRCP Rule 60(b)(6), the Magistrate abused his discretion.

c.

Even if the Magistrate could change child custody under IRCP Rule
60(b)(6), the Magistrate abused his discretion in doing so in this
matter.

IRCP Rule 60(b)(6) allows a Court to relieve a party from a judgment for "any reason
justifying relief'. IRCP Rule 60(b). However, Rule 60(b)(6) has clearly defined limits. Matter
of Estate of Bagley, 11 7 Idaho 1091, 1093 (1990). First, a motion under IRCP Rule 60(b )( 6)
must be made within a reasonable time. IRCP Rule 60(b). Second, a party making a Rule
60(b)(6) motion must demonstrate unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief. Id.
Third, a Rule 60(b)(6) motion cannot be a disguised substitute for a timely appeal. Id. Fourth, it
was stated in Berg v. Kendall that the appellate courts of this state have infrequently granted
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Berg at 578.
The Magistrate, to his credit, understood the dilemma he was faced with. He wanted to
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change custody, however, there was no pending petition to modify, there was no evidentiary
hearing, and there was an Order which provided that Dalrie had primary custody of the children. 4
Thus, he looked to Rule 60(b )( 6) to achieve his result. In doing so, he abused his discretion.
First of all, the Magistrate altered a custody Order which was two and one-half years old.
This does not comply with Rule 60(b)(6), as Hugo seeking this relief, under Rule 60(b)(6), in
2013, is not "a reasonable amount of time". If this is a "reasonable amount of time" under the
rule, then when is it not a reasonable amount of time for a magistrate to simply change custody
of minor children under this rule?
Second of all, there are no unique and compelling circumstances to justify Judge
Gardner's actions under Rule 60(b)(6). This is a typical custody case, wherein a change of
custody should only take place after the proper filing a Petition to Modify, and an evidentiary
hearing takes place. If it were otherwise, as this Magistrate believes, he can change a prior
custody order, under Rule 60(b)(6), with no pending action. This is a frightening proposition.
Imagine if a Magistrate has the power to change custody under IRCP Rule 60(b)(6), at any time
he feels it is necessary. He or she could change custody any time a party requests the same,
despite the fact that no Petition to Modify has been filed, discovery has not been completed, and
an evidentiary hearing has not been held. The factual scenario herein is a perfect example of
why the appellate courts of this state have infrequently granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Third and finally, even assuming Hugo's Motion for Expedited Hearing as to Custody
was properly filed as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, it is simply a disguised appeal. In his Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, trial Judge Blower gave Dalrie a choice. She could remain in
Idaho Falls and retain custody or she could leave to Salt Lake City, Utah and then Hugo would
4 It must he recalled that the Magistrate in his Order Granting ,'vlotion to Dismiss specifically ordered that
"the prior orders herein remain in full force and effect". R. p. 276.
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be awarded custody. Dalrie informed Judge Blower on February 11, 2011, that she intended
upon remaining in Idaho Falls and retaining custody of the children. Based upon this filing,
Judge Blower entered his Supplemental Order on April 29, 2011, and the custody determination
was finalized at that point. Once the final order is entered, it, and not the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions ofLaw control. See IRCP Rule 54(a/ and Hamilton v. Hamilton, 240 P.2d 14 (Cal.
App. 1952). 6 Thus, Hugo cannot argue that the alternatives given to Dalrie in the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions ofLaw still control, which is what he argued in his Motion for Expedited
Hearing as to Custody, and what the Magistrate essentially allowed to occur by changing
custody per IRCP Rule 60(b)(6). If Hugo wanted the final order to continue to provide that he
would receive cusfody of the children if Dalrie ever relocated to Salt Lake City, he should have
appealed the Supplemental Order, and requested that said language be included in said final
Order. 7 He did not do so, and relief granted under 60(b)(6) cannot be a disguised substitute for a
timely appeal, which the Magistrate has allowed to occur in his decision.
In this case, there is a final order, and it provides that Dalrie has primary custody of the
children. If Hugo is to be awarded custody, he must file a Petition to Modify and proceed
accordingly. The Magistrate erred by granting Hugo his request to change custody, pursuant to
IRCP Rule 60(b)(6).
d.

The Magistrate's finding that Dalrie made a deliberate
misrepresentation to the Court is not supported by substantial and

5 It is well established that the final order/Judgment is the controlling order in Idaho, and the following
examples are given to illustrate the same: the time limit for filing a request for fees or costs begins to run at the filing
of the Judgment (IRCP Rule 54(d)(5)); a Motion to Alter or Amend begins to run at the filing of the Judgment
(IRCP Rule 59(e)); and an Appeal begins to run at the filing of the Judgment (IRCP Rule 83(e)).
6 In said case, the California appellate court stated as follows: ''There is a distinction between the findings
and conclusions of a court and its judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount of the rendition of a
judgment they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of
course, be distinguished from the judgment." In so stating, the appellate court held that the statement in the findings
of fact which did not make it into the judgment, had no validity.
7 Dalrie is not conceding that Hugo would have been correct ifhe would have proceeded with an appeal on
this issue.
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competent evidence.
From the Order Granting Motion.for Expedited Hearing as to Custody, it is clear that the
Magistrate found that the Supplemental Order was entered based upon a "deliberate
misrepresentation to the court by Dalrie". R. p. 323. This finding is not supported by substantial
and competent evidence. There has been no evidentiary hearing on this issue, and it is
impossible for Judge Gardner, without such a hearing, to know what Dalrie's intentions were
when she filed her Statement of Unequivocal Desire on February 11, 2011. She obviously
changed her mind at some point after she signed the Statement of Unequivocal Desire and was
determined to move to Salt Lake City, however, it is impossible for the Magistrate to know when
this occurred, especially with no evidentiary hearing. Second, Dalrie's statement of her
intentions to stay in Idaho, as provided to the Court on February 11, 2011 cannot be found to be
a "fraud upon the court" or a misrepresentation. Our Idaho Supreme Court in Rae v. Bunce, 145
Idaho 798, 801, 186 P .3d 654, 657 (2008) stated:
Rule 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes that
courts have the inherent power "to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court." "The term 'fraud upon the court' contemplates
more than interparty misconduct, and, in Idaho, has been held to
require more than perjury or misrepresentation by a party or
witness." Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,334,612 P.2d
1175, 1181 ( 1980). It 'will be found only in the presence of such
'tampering with the administration of justice' as to suggest 'a
wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the
public.' " Id. (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hart(ord Empire
Co .. 322 U.S. 238, 246, 64 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 88 L.Ed. 1250, I 25556 ( 1944 )). "The party asserting a claim of fraud on the court must
establish that an unconscionable plan or scheme was used to
improperly influence the court's decision and that such acts
prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting its case
or defense." 4 7 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments§ 728 (2006).
Thus, even assuming Dalrie made a misstatement to the Court (which she adamantly denies),
said statement would not rise to the level of "tampering with the administration of justice'' so as
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to "suggest a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public". Based
upon these arguments, the Magistrate's factual finding, as complained of herein, must be set
aside.

e.

Conclusion.

The Magistrate clearly abused his discretion in altering custody between the parties
pursuant to IRCP Rule 60(b)(6), when there was no Petition to Modify pending and no
evidentiary hearing. This decision (along with the decision to award Hugo child support from
Dalrie) must be reversed, and the Supplemental Order, as originally written, must be the
controlling Order regarding custody and child support.

2.

Even if the Magistrate's actions in changing custody under Rule 60(b)(6) are
upheld, the Magistrate erred in failing to define Dalrie's visitation rights with
the children.

The trial court has broad discretion in establishing visitation rights, and is not confined by
the allegations of the petition to modify in seeking out what custody arrangement would be in the
best interest of the child. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 716 (2007). A court, by defining
details of visitation, is merely supplying for the parties the element ofreasonableness intended
by the court, and fashioning the visitation remedy that the non-custodial parent should have. Id.
at 716-17. The Supreme Court has suggested that cooperating divorced parents can achieve far
more for their children than might flow from even the best thought-out orders of the courts. Id.
at 717. However, when parents cannot agree on the time and places for visitation, the trial court
is required, on proper application, to define "reasonable visitation'' in such detail as may be
necessary. Id.
This is a high conflict case, as can be seen by the repository print out, alone. It is clear
that the parties will not be able to reach an agreement regarding Dalrie's visitation if Judge
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Gardner's custody determination is upheld. Judge Gardner, thus, should have entered a visitation
schedule for Dalrie with the children, and his failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.
3.

The Magistrate erred by awarding Hugo his attorney fees under I.C. §12120.

The Magistrate awarded attorney fees to Hugo under §12-120 in both its Order Granting
Motion to Dismiss entered August 30, 2013 and its Order Granting Motion for Expedited
Hearing as to Custody entered October 3, 2013. The Magistrate abused his discretion in so

doing.
It has been held in Idaho that§ 12-120 does not apply to divorce actions. Smith v. Smith,
131 Idaho 800 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998). The Idaho Court of Appeals in said case stated as follows
regarding wife's claim for an award of attorney fees pursuant to LC. §12-120:
Sharon's assertion of a claim under § 12-120 is inappropriate. The
action underlying the judgment that is the subject of this appeal
was a divorce action, not an action "where the amount pleaded is
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less" nor an action to
recover upon an account, note, contract for goods or services,
commercial transaction or the like. Section 12-120 is therefore
inapplicable.
Clearly, under Smith, attorney fees cannot be awarded to Hugo. Further, under a plain reading
of the statute, none of the subsections of§ 12-120 apply. Subsections (3), (4), and (5) address
matters other than divorce and post-divorce proceedings, and subsections ( 1) and (2) address
attorney fees wherein a claim for monetary damages are at issue. In awarding fees to Hugo
under § 12-120, the Magistrate abused his discretion, and the decision must be reversed.
Finally, even if this Court believes that the Magistrate can award attorney fees to Hugo
pursuant to I.C. § 12-120, the award should be set aside as Hugo should never have been deemed
the ''prevailing party" due to the Magistrate's errors, as argued above.
4.

Dalrie should he awarded attornev fees and costs on this appeal.
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There is no justifiable basis for Hugo to oppose the relief sought in this appeal, for all of
the reasons argued in this brief. If he does, Dalrie should be awarded her attorney fees on appeal
pursuant to LC. §12-121. Attorney fees on appeal should be granted pursuant to LC. § 12-121, if
the court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. Wilson v. Wilson, 131 Idaho 533 (citing
Balderson v. Balderson, 127 Idaho 48, 54 (1995) (1998)). Here, the Magistrate clearly erred in
changing custody to Hugo under the guise of IRCP Rule 60(b )( 6). If Hugo challenges the issues
raised in this brief, then it must be found that he is defending this case frivolously, unreasonably,
and without foundation, and Dalrie should be awarded his attorney fees and costs on appeal.

V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the issues raised in this appeal, the decision of the Magistrate to change
custody (along with the decision to order Dalrie to pay child support), pursuant to IRCP Rule
60(b)(6), must be set aside, and the Supplemental Order entered on April 29, 2011, shall be
determined to be the current Order of the Court related to custody matters, visitation matters, and
child support issues. Further, the Magistrate's award of attorney fees pursuant to LC. §12-120
must be set aside, and Dalrie should be awarded her attorney fees for pursuing this appeal
pursuant to LC. § 12-121.
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